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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the potential impact of increased R&D efforts and 
structural change in Portugal on labour productivity. The paper addresses 
Portugal’s ambition, expressed in the 2005 Technological Plan. Based on 
existing literature on the relation between R&D expenditures, structural change 
and productivity, we evaluate the contribution of R&D and high-tech industries 
on productivity over the last 30 years. Our results confirm the importance of 
governement’s R&D and of business R&D in the medium to high-tech sectors, 
as they stimulate productivity growth. However, we cannot hypothesize that 
productivity growth was primarily rooted on the development of medium-high 
technology industries.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Economic competitiveness of economies may be broadly analysed on the basis 
of a set of indicators, that is, production performance, productivity, innovation 
and international trade performance. Recent data on these indicators had given 
rise to serious concerns over the comparative performance of Portugal (and even 
Europe2) over the last 15 years or so.  
The data for Portugal reveal that after the high-growth “new-economy” 
years of the second half of the last decade, growth has been considerably below 
the average of the EU-25. By 2005, Portuguese GDP per capita amounted to just 
75 percent of the EU average. By 2005 real GDP per hour worked corresponded 
to 68 percent of EU-25 labour productivity. Indeed, increasing productivity 
emerged as main economic challenge for Europe and Portugal in particular.  
Conscious of the gap, and in line with the European directives, in 2005 
Portugal launched the Technological Plan with the goal of fostering growth and 
competitiveness. The overall goal has been embedded in a set of policy 
guidelines that include the following axes:  
1. Knowledge – To qualify the Portuguese for the knowledge society, 
fostering structural measures which aim at enhancing the average 
qualification level of the population, implementing a broad and 
diversified lifelong learning system and mobilizing the Portuguese for the 
Information Society; 
2. Technology – To overcome the scientific and technological gap, 
reinforcing public and private scientific and technological competences 
and recognizing the role played by enterprises in the process of creation 
of qualified jobs and Research & Development (R&D) related activities; 
3. Innovation – To boost Innovation, helping the productive chain to get 
adapted to the challenges of Globalization by means of the diffusion and 
development of new procedures, organizational systems, services and 
goods. 
 
Within the spefific objectives and targets, it is notorious the attention diverted 
towards the need to increase the value added per employee and thus to reducing 
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the gap with the EU-25. The increase of public and business R&D is also a 
priority and a specific objective of the plan. Medium and high-tech industries 
deserve otherwise particular enphasis in the Technological Plan. The data of the 
year base and of the Portuguese targets related with R&D and industrial 
structural change are reflected in the next table.  
 
Table 1. Selected targets of the Portuguese Technological Plan 
Indicator Indicators Target 2010 Portugal EU-25 Year 
Public spending in R&D as 
percentage of GDP 1% 0.6% 0.7% 2002 S&T Business spending in R&D as 
percentage of GDP 0.8% 0.3% 1..3% 2002 
Employment in medium and 
high-tech industries as percentage 
of total employment 
4.7% 3.1% 6.6% 2003 
Value added of medium and 
high-tech industries 6.2% 4.9% 15.8% 2003 
Exports of high-tech as 
percentage of total exports 11.4% 7.4% 17.8% 2003 
Competitiveness 
& 
Innovation 
Creation of firms in medium and   
high-tech sectors as percentage of 
total nº of enterprises creation 
12.5% - - - 
Source: Technological Plan (2006).  
 
These aims and targets of the plan are clearly understood within a context of 
generalized acceptance of the nexus between innovation, structural change and 
productivity. It is often argued that R&D and high-tech industries drive growth 
processes, and that they are the sources of growth in output, employment and 
productivity in the knowledge economy. Following Kaloudis and Smith (2005), 
a broad set of hypotheses are implied in these R&D-biased explanations of 
growth. We highlight the following: 
• Innovation accounts for a significant part of growth in modern economies; 
• There should be a significiant correlation between shares of high-tech in 
total output and levels/growth rates of productivity and GDP. 
 
Regarding the first hypotheses, the relation between R&D and productivity is 
strongly accepted in the literature. Even though, Griliches (1995) argues that the 
scientific and quantitative support for the relationship between the two aspects is 
rather limited. As for the impact of changes in industrial structure, it is widely 
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recognized that the most technologically developed industries are more 
productive than the remainder (Aiginger, 2001). However, empirical evidence 
on the contribution of structural change within manufacturing to productivity is 
rather scarce and far from consensual (Kaloudis and Smith, 2005).  
In what follows we explore the theoretical support for these hypotheses 
and test them in the Portuguese case. Because the high-tech industries, by 
definition, are all located within manufacturing, we focus in this paper primarily 
on the manufacturing sector. This study presents estimates of the contribution of 
R&D and structural change to productivity growth in the Portuguese 
Manufacturing Industry (PMI) over the period 1980-2003. It contributes to the 
existing literature in this field of analysis in two ways. First, the major sources 
of new technology are taken into account simultaneously: public R&D and 
business R&D in medium to high-tech sectors. Second, an attempt is made to 
evaluate the impact of the increasing weight of medium to high-tech industries 
in the manufacturing employment. The results are intended to provide insights 
into the following: 
• The contribution of public research to productivity growth; 
• The contribution of business R&D in high-tech sectors to productivity 
growth; 
• The importance of structural transformation towards innovation intensive 
sectors to productivity growth. 
 
The article is organised as follows. In the next section we provide the theoretical 
background to analyse the relation between R&D and productivity and then 
between structural change and productivity. In section 3 we discuss the data and 
methodology, and point to the critical aspects of Portuguese competitiveness, 
including a characterization of the manufacturing industry over the period  
1980-2003. Subsection 3.2 presents our empirical study while section 4 derives 
policy implications and further research avenues.   
 
2.  Productivity, R&D and industrial structure 
 
In this section we discuss the relationships between productivity, R&D and 
industrial structure. These are used to define the hypoheses to be tested in the 
context of the Portuguese economy.  
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2.1.  R&D and productivity 
 
“It is now well-known that both the governments of and private 
firms in most industrialised countries have devoted an 
increasing amount of resources to R&D. One of the main 
objectives of economic analysis is to evaluate whether the 
returns on this investment justify the initial expenditure. To this 
end, the relationship between R&D and productivity growth 
has been investigated at different levels of aggregation: 
economy, sector, industry and firm.” (Aiginger, 2001)  
 
The relationship between R&D and productivity of a country is commonly 
accepted in the literature. R&D resulting in new goods, new processes and new 
knowledge, is generally accepted as major source of technical change. As 
defined by the Frascati Manual (OECD, 1993), R&D “comprise creative work 
undertaken on a systematic basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge and 
the use of this stock of knowledge to devise new applications”.  
The relationship between R&D and innovation is a complex and a       
non-linear one. In order to capture the links between R&D and productivity it is 
necessary to take several aspects into account. First, there are different types of 
R&D, and the effects of R&D on productivity may work through various 
channels. Second, R&D is not the only source of new technology: in modern 
and industrial economies, other activities such as learning by doing or design are 
conducted in most cases on the basis of new technology coming out of R&D 
(e.g. changes in the organisation of business related to the use of information 
and communication technology).  
However, it is also recognised that it is difficult to occur substantial 
advances in technology without work undertaken on a systematic basis (even 
serendipity tends to develop in such a context), and R&D is a good indicator of 
this broader phenomenon. 
There is major evidence that links R&D to productivity. In modern 
growth economies, it is clear that the inputs of capital and labour alone cannot 
account for a large part of output growth (Solow, 1957). In rich empirical 
tradition of work on productivity growth, the total factor productivity growth has 
been related to the accumulation of a “knowledge stock”, which is not accounted 
for in the measurement of the conventional stock of capital, but increases output 
via innovation and technological change. Economic theory (Solow, 1957; 
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Romer, 1990) points to technical change as the major source of productivity 
growth in the long run. R&D expenditures have been suggested as a way of 
measuring this knowledge stock, giving rise to a range of works relating R&D 
expenditures and productivity.  
In 1979 Griliches discusses issues in assessing the contribution of R&D to 
productivity growth, and in 1980 he evaluated the returns of R&D expenditures 
in the private sector, using cross-section data from a set of companies over the 
period 1957-1963. The results reveal a positive correlation between the R&D 
expenditure and the productivity achieved by the companies, wich is given by a 
positive coefficient of the R&D of about 0.07. In a following work, Griliches 
(1995) discussed the econometric results and measurement issues in the relation 
between R&D and productivity. In his review, he refers the co-existance of three 
alternatives to analyse the relationship: case studies, econometric studies and the 
statistical analysis of patents. He concludes that the economic literature placed 
particular emphasis on econometric studies, mainly the Cobb-Douglas 
production functions and the CDM3 model.  
Guellec and Van Pottelsberge (2001) studied different types of R&D and 
analyzed their long-term effects on multifactor productivity growth. Using a 
sample of 16 OECD countries over the period 1980-98, they found that an 
increase of 1% in business R&D leads to a rise of productivity in 0.13%. The 
effect is larger in countries where the share of defence-related government 
funding is smaller. If on the other hand foreign R&D increases 1%, then 
productivity will rise by 0.46%. Finaly, an increase of 1% in public R&D 
generates an increase of 0.17% in productivity growth. The effect is larger in 
countries where the share of universities (as opposed to government labs) is 
higher and in countries where the share of defence R&D is smaler. They also 
concluded that the effects of R&D are higher in countries whith higher business 
R&D intensity.  
Mairesse (2004) presents a model wich aims at quantifying the links 
between R&D, innovation and productivity on a panel of 4164 firms. According 
to his results, firms with a 20% share of innovative sales would be 15% more 
productive than firms with just 5% in innovative sales. In the same line, the 
productivity of a firm that has filed two European patents would be nearly 10% 
higher than that of a firm having filed a single patent. 
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As Mairesse, Wieser (2001) investigated the contribution of R&D to 
productivity performance at the micro level. Wieser’s study presents a review of 
the literature wich demonstrates a significant impact of R&D on firm 
performance, but revals that the extent of the impact differs widely. On his own 
empirical work for a sample of 2167 large, publicly traded firms in Europe and 
the US, he also confirms the positive and significant contribution of R&D to 
productivity growth, once that his results point to a private rate of return on 
R&D of about 12%. 
In these literature is also discussed the fact that the impact of R&D on the 
economy goes well beyond the direct private returns to the innovator. Hence, the 
economic literature contemplates the idea that expenditure in R&D can generate 
spillovers which assure a private return as well as a social return from this 
investment. Sveikauskas (2007) review of the literature on R&D and 
productivity growth shows that the overall rate of return to R&D is very large – 
about 25% for private return and 65% for social return. Most studies suggest that 
the private return of R&D represents only a third of the social return of R&D. 
Therefore, Wieser (2001) says that the incentives for the private sector invest in 
R&D does not reflect properly the value that the society receives from that 
research. This is one argument for the participation of the Government in the 
national R&D activities. Hence, the greater the divergence between the private 
and social returns of R&D, the stronger is the argument for the involvement of 
the Governement in these activities (Wieser, 2001). 
Government and university’s research has a direct effect on scientific 
knowledge and public missions, as it generates basic knowledge (Adams, 1990; 
Brooks, 1994). In many cases the effect of government’s research on 
productivity is not measured, either because it is indirect or because its results 
are not integrated in existing measures of GDP (health-related research allows to 
improve length and quality of life, which are not taken into account in GDP 
measures). Basic research performed mainly by universities enhances the stock 
of knowledge of the society. New knowledge is not considered as an output in 
the current system of national accounts (contrary to physical investment and 
software for instance), and as such it is not included in GDP measures: hence the 
direct outcome of basic research is overlooked. However, basic research may 
open new opportunities to business research, which in turn affects productivity 
(Adams, 1990; Brooksm, 1994; Guellec and Van Pottelsbergh, 2001). 
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It is therefore not surprising that there have been very few studies of the 
effects of public research on productivity. Only some components of public 
research have been used in empirical frameworks. For instance, Adams (1990) 
finds that fundamental stocks of knowledge, proxied by accumulated academic 
scientific papers, significantly contributed to productivity growth in US 
manufacturing industries. Another example is provided by Poole and Bernard 
(1992) for military innovations in Canada, who present evidence that a   
defence-related stock of innovation has a negative and significant effect on the 
total factor productivity growth of four industries over the period 1961-85. 
As seen before, the idea that innovation stimulated by R&D expenditure 
makes an important contribution to productivity growth has been demonstrated 
by several authors. However, the relation between innovative activities, 
innovation itself and productivity is rather complex and far from consensual. In 
fact, other authors suggest the existence of a negative correlation between 
innovation and productivity in the short run (Young, 1991; Utterback, 1994; 
Jovanovic and Nyarko, 1996; Christensen, 1997; Ahn, 1999; Bessen, 2002). 
What is a fact is that due to the rapid progress in the number and quality 
of studies focused on the relation between R&D and productivity, our 
knowledge of these issues has seriously improved in the last two decades. 
Nevertheless, it remains rather modest because of the substantial difficulties in 
measurement and in statistical inference of causal relationships from             
non-experimental data (Mairesse, 2004). 
 
2.2.  Structural change and productivity 
 
The relationship between the economic structure of a country and its 
productivity growth has received more attention in recent decades. Salter (1960) 
was the first to emphasize the importance that a structural change (modifications 
in the sectoral localization of labour, or possibly in the production factors in 
general) can have in boosting productivity.  
Since then, several authors have studied the relocation of inputs in the 
manufacturing industry, because although there is no doubt as to the 
productivity gains resultant from the shift of inputs from agriculture to 
manufacturing (Syrquin 1988), the consequences of movements that occur 
inside the manufacturing industry are not very clear (Rocha, 2005).  
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While Salter (1960) presents significantly strong results about the benefits 
of structural changes in the UK economy between 1924 and 1950, more recent 
studies (Fagerberg, 2000; Timmer and Szirmai, 2000; Carree, 2002; Kiliçaslan 
and Taymaz, 2004; Singh, 2004) as we shall see below show more contained 
results. Some studies present a negligible or even a negative contribution of 
structural change to productivity growth (Singh, 2004; Kiliçaslan and Taymaz, 
2004; Kaloudis and Smith, 2005). 
Fagerberg (2000) focused on the impact of specialization and structural 
changes on productivity growth in manufacturing, using a sample of 39 
countries and 24 industries over the period 1973-1990. The results reported in 
his study indicate that structural change still matters, but in a different way than 
before, because unlike what happened in the first half of the last century, the 
most technologically sophisticated industries decreased their shares in total 
employment between 1970 and 1990. In fact, the data suggest that in the sample 
studied by Salter, 1% higher productivity growth was associated with 1.4% 
higher growth in employment, while in Fagerberg’s sample the relationship 
between productivity growth and employment is less than one half of that level. 
Even though, he argues that countries that have managed to increase their 
presence in the technologically most progressive industries like electronics (the 
so called electronics revolution), have experienced higher productivity growth in 
their manufacturing sector than other countries, due to important spill-over 
effects. 
Similar evidences to those of Fagerberg (2000) are presented by Timmer 
and Szirmai (2000), but in this case on 4 Asian countries4 and 13 subsectors of 
the manufacturing industry over the period 1963-1993. 
Adding to Fagerberg (2000), Carree (2002) seeks to complement the 
analysis by estimating the impact of the employment share of technologically 
progressive industries using a different methodology. Fagerberg claims that an 
increase of the “electronics” industry in total employment will generate higher 
productivity growth on the manufacturing sector. However, the size of the 
impact, and as a consequence the extent of spill-overs, is found to be much 
smaller than estimated by Fagerberg. 
The relationship between structural changes and productivity growth in 
the manufacturing sector is also investigated by Singh (2004) in his study on 
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South Korea over the period 1970-2000. The results shows that in the seventies 
occured a structural bonus (productivity gains due to the structural change). 
However, between 1980 and 2000 the relocation of inputs in the manufacturing 
sector has not ensured benefits to productivity. 
Kiliçaslan and Taymaz (2004) found similar results in their study on the 
relationship between industrial structure, productivity and competitiveness in 
manufacturing industry for a sample of MENA5 and Asian6 countries from 1965 
to 1999. This study shows that the impact of the structural change in the 
productivity growth of the manufacturing sector is negligible for most countries, 
especially after the eighties. In this period, countries like Jordan and Korea 
present a negative correlation between the structural change and the productivity 
growth. 
Using simple correlation analysis, Kaloudis and Smith’s (2005) study of 
11 OECD economies for a 23-year period (1980-2002) with data from the 
OECD’s STAN database, concluded that structural change (share of the 
electronics and other high-tech industries) within manufacturing was not the 
direct cause of the growth process in advanced OECD economies. They did not 
find evidence supporting the argument that the high-tech economies are also the 
high growth economies. They say that different economies can follow different 
paths of economic growth. Countries play different roles in the differentiated 
international economic system with clear patterns of division of labour among 
the highly developed economies.  
Kaloudis and Smith (2005) show that the higher the share of high-tech 
industries in manufacturing value added, the higher is GDP per inhabitant. 
Looking at income levels first, there is indeed a relationship between 
technological intensity and the level of income across national economies. 
However, they did not find any positive relationship when we compare the  
high-tech share in manufacturing value added with the rate of growth of GDP 
per inhabitant. Hence, they cannot conclude, therefore, that high-tech economies 
are also the high growth economies. Moreover, an additional important point is 
the absence of any convincing evidence for a hypothesis that low-tech 
economies are low growth economies. If anything, there is weak evidence in the 
data that low-tech economies are higher growth economies than the high-tech. 
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This evidence suggests that growth does not rest on the high-tech driven 
structural change. 
Another fundamental question raised by Kaloudis and Smith (2005) is in 
which way the causality runs, since high-tech industries (in particular aerospace, 
ICT, and pharmaceuticals) have in practice been created via significant 
government support, and have invariably been initiated by substantial    
publicly-supported R&D infrastructures (Mowery and Rosenberg (1989), as 
well as Bruland and Mowery (2004) provide good overviews of this discussion). 
There may therefore be a pattern of causality that runs from high levels of 
income, to government budgetary positions, to the creation of industries – that 
is, some R&D-intensive industries may be a consequence of high income, not a 
cause of it. 
From the discussion, we test the R&D-biased explanations of growth, 
from which it is possible to derive the following hypotheses to be tested 
empirically in our econometric model:  
H1) Public R&D activity has a positive impact on manufacturing 
productivity; 
H2) Business R&D in the High-technology and Medium-high-technology 
industries has a positive impact on manufacturing productivity; 
H3) An increase of the high-technology and medium-high-technology 
industries on the manufacturing employment has a positive impact on 
the manufacturing productivity. 
 
3. Productivity, R&D and structural change: an analysis of the 
Portuguese manufacturing industry 
 
The data considered in this part of the study are mainly based on three basic 
concepts: R&D expenditure, employment and value added. The National 
Statistics Institute of Portugal (Instituto Nacional de Estatística) and the R&D 
Survey from the Science and Higher Education Observatory (Observatório da 
Ciência e do Ensino Superior) are our primary data sources to estimate the 
econometric model over the period 1980-2003. In this study, we had to 
overcome an obstacle caused by a change in methodology by the National 
Statistics Institute of Portugal in 1990 with regard to data collection. Thus, it 
was necessary to extrapolate data before 1990 to ensure a single and uniform 
sequence of information. In the first part of the section we overview the 
 12 
evolution of the main variables, and test the relationship between them in the 
second part of the section.  
 
3.1. Portuguese manufacturing industry in perspective: productivity, 
R&D and industrial structure 
 
3.1.1 Productivity 
 
With respect to competitiveness, let us consider what recent data tells us about 
the EU in general and the Portuguese economy in particular. The data for 
Portugal reveal that after the high-growth “new-economy” years of the second 
half of the last decade, growth has been considerably below the average of the 
EU-25. By 2005, Portuguese GDP per capita amounted to just 75 percent of the 
EU average.  
 
Table 2. Real GDP growth and Real GDP per capita in PPS (EU25=100) 
 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005 GDPpc 2005 
Portugal 1,7 4,1 0,6 0,4 75 
EU-25 1,7 3,0 1,8 1,8 100 
USA 2,5 4,1 2,4 3,2 152 
Source: European Commission (2006a). Table 2.1. 
 
Table 3 presents labour productivity growth rates in Portugal, the EU-25 and the 
US7. The data clearly points towards a loss of competitiveness of the EU-25 as 
compared with the US from the mid-1990s onwards8. Portugal registered low 
labour productivity growth overall. By 2005, real GDP per hour worked 
                                               
7
 The last two columns present data on productivity per worker and per hour worked in 2005. 
There is an   on-going debate on whether this difference in the supply of working hours is due 
to different preferences for leisure in the EU and the US, to different taxation systems, or to 
differences in labour market regulations (see CPB (2006), for a recent literature review). 
8
 In the period of 2000-2005, and by historical standards, TFP growth in the EU was very low. 
The explanations put forward to explain EU TPF performance vary between those that 
highlight limited innovation, undeveloped services, issues of regulation and infrastructures 
(European Commission, 2006a). Also, the picture is quite differentiated across EU member 
states. For instance, Nordic and Anglo-Saxon countries in general have TFP growth rates that 
are high by global standards and in some cases higher than those of US while, at the opposite 
end, most South European countries performed poorly.   
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corresponded to 68 percent of EU-25 labour productivity. Increasing 
productivity emerged as main economic challenge for Europe and Portugal in 
particular.  
 
Table 3. Growth of labour productivity per person employed and 2005 levels of 
real GDP per person employed (ppe) and real GDP per hour worked (phw) 
Average annual labour productivity growth Real GDP 2005 
 
1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005 GDP ppe GDP phw 
Portugal 2,3 2,2 0,3 0,3 66 68 
EU-25 2,2 2,0 1,3 1,1 100 100 
USA 1,3 2,0 2,2 1,8 137 129 
Source: European Commission (2006a), Table 2.3. 
 
From Graph 1, we can see that labour productivity in the EU-25 is very similar 
to that of Japan. On another level, the US is the most productive state. In the 
EU-15, the Portuguese economy reveals the lowest levels of productivity (about 
65% of the EU-25 average). If we consider the 25 Member-states in that period, 
Portugal ranks in at 19th position. 
 
Graph 1. Labour productivity by employee in the EU-25, Portugal, USA and 
Japan (1996-06) 
Source: Own elaboration based on “Boletim Estatístico” (2005) of “Direcção-Geral de 
Estudos, Estatística e Planeamento”. Data from Eurostat.  
* Estimative 
Note: EU-25 = 100 
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The developments in manufacturing have an important role on the overall 
productivity growth. Recall that in Europe (EU-25), manufacturing accounts for 
about a third of employment and value-added (Eurostat, 2004). In Portugal the 
share of the manufacturing is similar. By 2003, the Portuguese manufacturing 
(section D)9 accounted for 28 percent of the value added and employment.10 , 11 
Looking in detail at the labour productivity in the PMI over a long time 
period, we verify that productivity in manufacting has increased considerably, as 
result of both, a decline in employment and an increase in value added. The 
period under analysis can be divided in two cicles. The first cicle runs from 
1980-1985, and the second from 1985-2003. The first period is characterized by 
moderate productivity growth. Aguiar and Martins (2004) explain the 
developments based on the international crisis on the aftermath of the Oil 
Shocks of 1973 and 1979, internal policies and the austerity implied by the 
stability plans negotiated wit the International Monetary Fund (IMF)12. 
 
Graph 2. Labour productivity of the Portuguese mananufacturing industry 
(1980-2003) 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on values of “Estatísticas Industriais” (1980-1989) 
and “Estatísticas das Empresas” (1990-2003) from the National Statistics Institute of Portugal. 
Note: Value added of PMI at constant prices (consumer price index – base year 1986). 
                                               
9
 Manufacturing corresponds to section D “Secção D” and is formed by 14 subsections 
(industries), according to the Portuguese Classification of the Economic Activities “CAE – 
Rev. 2.1”. 
10
 Manufacturing employed about 1.153.914 employees in 1980 and 886.253 in 2003. 
11
 Authors’ own calculations based on values of “Inquérito Permanente ao Emprego” (1980) 
from the National Statistics Institute of Portugal. 
12
 Stabilization Plan of 1978 -1979, and the Second Stablization Plan of 1983-1984. 
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From 1985 onwards, industrial productivity accelerated, albeit in a context of 
‘desindustrialization’13. Aguiar and Martins (2004) proposed four main reasons 
for this evolution, namely the macroeconomic results of the stabilization plans, 
institutional and political stability fostering private initiative, accession to the 
European Economic Community (EEC) in 1986, and favourable international 
conditions (depreciation of the USD, decline in interest rates and in the Oil 
Prices).  
Although labour productivity in the PMI and in the Portuguese economy 
in general has registered a positive evolution in the last decades, it continues to 
remain significantly below the European average. The above discussion 
highlights that Portugal has to generate faster productivity growth. The data also 
suggest that with a view to competitiveness it is not enough to look at capital per 
worker, but that innovation and an adequate business environment (factors 
considered by TFP) are fundamental with a view to competitiveness and growth, 
an issue focused by the Lisbon Agenda. 
 
3.1.2. R&D and innovation 
 
With regard to innovation indicators, the picture is not very favourable in spite 
of considerable advances. Data on R&D intensity (R&D expenditures as 
percentage of GDP) reveals that Portugal is well below the EU-25 average. 
Business expenditures in R&D in particular are relatively smaller than in other 
European counterparts, while public expenditures represent the largest share of 
total R&D in the country.  
 
Graph 3. R&D intensity in the EU-25, USA, Portugal and Japan - 2002 
Source: Science and Technology – Statistics in Focus (2005), Eurostat. 
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 A decline in the weigh of the industry in the overall economy.  
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The European Innovation Scoreboard (European Commission, 2006c) ranks 
economies according to a summary innovation index (SII) that combines five 
different dimensions, grouped in inputs and outputs.14,15 As far as Portugal is 
concerned, it is part of a group (Slovenia, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland, 
Latvia, Greece and Bulgaria) of catching-up countries with SII scores well 
below the EU-25, albeit with a faster than average improvement in innovation 
performance. Public R&D contributed significantly to that end, albeit the data of 
private R&D intensity in manufacturing overall shows also considerable 
improvements since 1980. 
 
Graph 4. Private R&D intensity in Portuguese mananufacturing industry,    
1980-2003 
Source: Own elaboration based on “Estatísticas Industriais” (1980-1989), “Estatísticas das 
Empresas” (1990-2003), “Anuário Estatístico” (1986-1989) and “Anuário Estatístico de 
Portugal” (1990-2003) from the National Statistics Institute of Portugal, as well as data from 
the R&D Survey by the “Observatório da Ciência e do Ensino Superior”. 
 
                                               
14
 At the innovation inputs level: Innovation drivers (5 indicators, measuring the structural 
conditions of the innovation potential), knowledge creation (4 indicators, measuring the 
investments in R&D activities, considered key elements in a successful knowledge-based 
economy), innovation and entrepreneurship (6 indicators, measuring the efforts towards 
innovation at the firm level). Innovation outputs include two dimensions, namely applications 
(5 indicators, measuring the performance, expressed in terms of labour and business activities, 
and their value added in innovative sectors) and intellectual property (5 indicators, measuring 
the achieved results in terms of successful know-how). 
15
 A comparison with the US and Japan indicates that both are still ahead of the EU-25 in 
terms of innovation performance. 
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Looking at the data, it is clear the positive trend from 1988 onwards, in spite of 
the slight decline in early 1990s and 2000s mainly associated with the 
international crisis (Biscaya et al., 2002). Neverthless, business R&D is still 
realively lower than in the EU. The small size of the firms has been advanced as 
one of the possible explanations for the low levels of R&D in Portuguese 
industry. Another set of reasons are related to the industrial structure, namely the 
strong concentration in low-tech sectors (Gonçalves et al., 1999), as we shall see 
in the next section. Indeed, the importance of medium and high-tech sectors on 
the innovation performance of country is clear when we look the distribution of 
the investments in R&D. For the case of the PMI, the table shows a 
concentration in the high-technology and medium-high-technology industries. 
Machinery equipment, electric and optical equipment as well as the transport 
equipment industries represented in 2003 about 45% of the total expenditure in 
R&D carried out by the PMI. Coke and petroleum, chemicals and products must 
also be mentioned on account of their 25%. 
 
Table 4.  Structure of expenditure in R&D (current prices), 2003 
Branch of Economic Activity R&D (thousand ) R&D (%) 
D – Manufacturing 150.957,9 100 
DA – Food, beverages and tobacco 5.651 4 
DB – Textiles 10.509,9 7 
DC – Fur and leather 733,3 - 
DD – Wood, cork and products 3.718,0 2 
DE – Pulp, paper, paper products, publishing and printing 2.987,7 2 
DF – Coke and petroleum 
DG – Chemicals and products 37.249,0 25 
DH – Rubber and plastics 11.032,1 7 
DI – Non-metallic mineral products 6.830,0 5 
DJ – Basic metals and metallic products 2.833,5 2 
DK – Machinery equipment, n.e. c. 15.874,7 11 
DL – Electric and optical equipment 44.518,3 29 
DM – Transport equipment 7.346,8 5 
DN – Other manufacturing industries 1.673,6 1 
Source: Adapted from the R&D Survey (2003) by the “Observatório da Ciência e do Ensino 
Superior”. 
Note: Due to statistical secrecy reasons, the results of subsections DF and DG are presented as 
a whole.  
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3.1.3. Industrial structure 
 
Portugal is often characterised as specialising in labour intensive industries. An 
analysis of the employment structure within manufacturing reinforces this idea. 
In 2003, textiles still accounted for 26 percent of employment in Portuguese 
manufacturing. Then apperas food, beverages and tobacco followed by basic 
metals and metallic products with their 12 and 10 percent of the manufacturing 
employment. Machinery equipment, electric and optical equipment and transport 
equipment altogether account for only 15 percent of the manufacturing 
employment in 2003.  
 
Table 5. Structure of employment, 2003 
Industry Nº 
employees 
Employees 
(% on total) 
D – Manufacturing 886.253 
 
100 
DA – Food, beverages and tobacco 106.277 12 
DB – Textiles 222.602 26 
DC – Fur and leather 62.333 7 
DD – Wood, cork and products 48.611 5 
DE – Pulp, paper, paper products, publishing and printing 53.428 6 
DF – Coke and petroleum 
DG – Chemicals and products 
2.136 - 
DG – Chemicals  21.715 2 
DH – Rubber and plastics 24.511 3 
DI – Non-metallic mineral products 64.771 7 
DJ – Basic metals and metallic products 91.519 10 
DK – Machinery equipment, n.e. c. 43.124 5 
DL – Electric and optical equipment 49.027 6 
DM – Transport equipment 34.168 4 
DN – Other manufacturing industries 62.031 7 
Source: Own elaboration based on “Estatísticas das Empresas” (2003), from the National 
Statistics Institute of Portugal. 
 
The analysis of the PMI in terms of value-added reveals once more the weight of 
textiles, food, beverages and tobacco, with 14 and 13 percent of the PMI    
value-added in 2003. Machinery equipment, electric and optical equipment and 
transport equipment, account altogether for 19 percent of the value added in 
2003.  
 
 
 19 
Table 6. Structure of value-added (current prices), 2003 
Industry VA (thousand ) VA (%) 
D – Manufacturing 18.470.272 
 
100 
DA – Food, beverages and tobacco 2.604.169 13 
DB – Textiles 2.638.017 14 
DC – Fur and leather 668.708 4 
DD – Wood, cork and products 806.520 4 
DE – Pulp, paper, paper products, publishing and printing 1.803.996 10 
DF – Coke and petroleum 
DG – Chemicals and products 
523.801 3 
DG- Chemicals  1.049.753 6 
DH – Rubber and plastics 719.447 4 
DI – Non-metallic mineral products 1.711.180 9 
DJ – Basic metals and metallic products 1.719.353 9 
DK – Machinery equipment, n.e. c. 
a, N.E. 
1.026.060 6 
DL – Electric and optical equipment 1.346.985 7 
DM – Transport equipment 1.018.573 6 
DN – Other manufacturing industries 833.709 5 
Source: Own elaboration based on “Estatísticas das Empresas” (2003), from the National 
Statistics Institute of Portugal. 
 
Regarding specialisation in perspective with Europe, three groups of countries 
can be identified within the EU-15. The first one includes countries specialised 
in high labour skill sectors (Belgium, France, and Luxembourg) and high to 
intermediate labour skills (Denmark, Finland, Sweden and to a lesser extent the 
United Kingdom). The second group includes countries specialised in the two 
lowest categories of labour skills and includes Portugal (apart from Austria, 
Spain, Greece and Italy). Note that in the study by DG Enterprise of the 
European Commission (2006b), Portugal is characterised as specialising16 in 
                                               
16
 The indicator of sectoral specialization of EU-15 member states here presented compares a 
country’s value-added shares across industries with the average EU-15 industry’s shares. The 
indicator is defined, for country ‘i’ and industry ‘j’, with VA being value added and EU 
corresponding to the EU-15, as to indicate specialization equal to the EU average if the value 
is 1 for a given industry. The higher the value of the indicator, the higher the country’s 
specialization compared with the EU average.  
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leather and footwear, clothing, textiles, wood and products of wood, financial 
intermediation, radio and television receivers. Finally, there is a group of 
countries without a clear specialisation profile (Germany, the Netherlands and 
Ireland). This implies that the distribution of value added is very similar to the 
one of the EU-15 as a whole. 
 
Graph 5. Sectoral share in manufacturing value added (%) (Mean 2000-02), 
Portugal and EU 
 
Source: European Commission (2006b) 
 
Following the OECD High-tech classification of manufacturing industries17, we 
may analyse the PMI’s employment structure at this level. In this regard, great 
stability is verified over the years, where the low-technology and            
medium-low-technology industries are visibly dominant. These industries as a 
whole represent in 2006 about 84% of the total employment in the Portuguese 
manufacturing, while in the set of 4 countries considered in the table they don’t 
represent more than 58%. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
17
 In appendice 1 we provide the OECD High-tech classification of manufacturing industries. 
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Table 7. Employment structure in terms of industries by technological intensity 
(%) 
Portugal  Germany+UK+Italy+France* Global Technological 
Intensity 1985 1994 2003 2006 1985 1994 2006 
High-tech industries 3 3 3 2 9 9 7 
Medium-high-tech industries 12 13 13 14 32 33 35 
Medium-low-tech industries 26 25 21 25 24 
Low-tech industries 59 59 63 
84 
34 34 
58 
Total manufacturing 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Adapted from Godinho and Mamede (2004) except 2003 (authors’ own calculations 
based on values of “Estatísticas das Empresas” (2003) from the National Statistics Institute of 
Portugal) and 2006 (own calculations based on values of “Science, technology and innovation 
in Europe” (2008) from Eurostat). 
* Average from Germany, United Kingdom, Italy and France 
 
As seen, the structure of the PMI shows clearly the weight of low and medium 
to low technology sectors (Godinho e Mamede, 2004). Neverthless, the 
relationship between structure and productivity must not disregard the starting 
level. An increase in the weight of high and medium to high technology 
industries of about 1 percent may have significant impact on economies with a 
very low starting point (Kaloudis and Smith, 2005). Otherwise, even if an 
industry’s employment share remains constant over time, there may have been a 
lot of entry and exit of firms and innovation (products and processes) in that 
industry. As we mentioned in the previous section, high and medium to high 
technology industries are the most highly innovative within Portuguese 
manufacturing. These aspects need be considered. 
Hence, the emergence of competitors with a broad spectrum of 
comparative advantages in industrial activities has put the issue of the 
manufacturing industry’s future in industrialised countries on the agenda. The 
discussion of whether Europe can hold on to manufacturing assumes particular 
relevance for economies such as the Portuguese one, strongly open and 
relatively specialised in labour-intensive sectors. 
 
3.2 Productivity, R&D and structural change: an empirical application 
 
In the previous section 3.1 we highlighted the increase in PMI’s productivity as 
well as the developments regarding innovation and structural change. Following 
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the literature reviewed in section 2, three hypotheses are tested on the 
Portuguese manufacturing over the period 1980-2003: 
H1) Public R&D activity has a positive impact on manufacturing 
productivity; 
H2) Business R&D in the high-technology and medium-high-technology 
industries has a positive impact on manufacturing productivity; 
H3) An increase of the high-technology and medium-high-technology 
industries on the manufacturing employment has a positive impact on 
the manufacturing productivity. 
 
3.2.1 Econometric model 
 
If an exact innovation model in all its multiple dimensions was available, we 
would be able to fully understand the complex nature of innovation (Mairesse, 
2004). However, such a model does not exist. Nevertheless, in Mairesse (2004) 
words, “it is worth trying to account for innovation differences, even in a crude 
and simplified manner.” 
Since productivity is, among other things, a result of innovation, and 
innovation is, among other things, a result of R&D (Mairesse and Mohnen, 
2002), we present a multiple regression model that allows us to quantify the 
relation between a dependent variable (Y) and a set of independent variables 
(X0, X1, X2,..., Xn) through the estimation of their parameters (0, 1, 2…, n): 
 
ttnnttt uXXXY +++++= ββββ ...22110    , with X0 = 1  ;  t = 1,2...,T  
or               (1) 

=
++=
n
i
ttiit uXY
1
0 ββ    , with X0 = 1  ;  i = 1,2...,n  ;  t = 1,2,...T. 
 
Based on equation (1), we developed an econometric model in order to explain 
the PMI’s labour productivity. 
The econometric model includes public R&D activity by the Portuguese 
State (H1) and business R&D in medium and high-tech industries so as to 
analyze the relation between R&D and the PMI’s labour productivity, giving 
particular enphasis to R&D in medium and high intensive sectors (H2).  
To test Hypotheses 3 we included as a variable the weight of medium to 
high-tech industries on total manufacturing employment, as this group of 
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industries registered a slight increase over the period under analysis. In our 
study we considered the machinery equipment (ME), electric and optical 
equipment (EOE) and transport equipment (TE) sectors, which are classified by 
OECD as medium to high-tech intensive sectors.  
 
ttttt uXXXY ++++= 3322110 ββββ                                                             (1.1) 
with X0 = 1  ;  t = 1, 2, ...24 
 
where: 
 
• Y: stands for PMI labour productivity, which is represented by the 
logarithm of the ratio between the value added of PMI (constant prices: 
base year 1986) and employment in the PMI; 
• X1 : stands for public R&D intensity which is represented by the 
logarithm of the ratio between the Portuguese State’s expenditure in 
R&D and the value added of PMI;  
• X2 : stands for the private intensity in R&D of ME, EOE and TE, which 
is represented by the logarithm of the ratio between private expenditure 
in R&D by these three industries and the value added relative to ME, 
EOE and TE;  
• X3 : stands for the proportion that ME, EOE and TE as a whole have in 
the total employment of the PMI, which is represented by the logarithm 
of the ratio between employment in these three industries and total 
employment in the PMI. 
 
We further introduced a number of lags for R&D related variables (X1 and X2). 
The introduction of lags is based on the fact that R&D expenditures may well 
take time to affect output. Indeed, investments in R&D do not normally produce 
immediate results because time is necessary before new knowledge can be 
developed, so that it can be disseminated and commercialized in the economy 
(Griliches, 1979). 
Seeing that a significant number of studies have demonstrated that this lag 
varies on average between one and four years (Mansfield et al., 1971; Pakes and 
Schankerman, 1984; Acs and Audretsch, 1988), we also estimate our model 
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considering a temporal lag  of one, two, three and four years for the variables 
related to R&D intensity (X1  and X2).  
As referred previously, the data used in the study are mainly from The 
National Statistics Institute of Portugal (Instituto Nacional de Estatística) and 
the R&D Survey from the Science and Higher Education Observatory 
(Observatório da Ciência e do Ensino Superior). In this study, we had to 
overcome a difficulty caused by a new methodology introduced by the National 
Statistics Institute of Portugal in 1990 with regard to data collection. Therefore, 
it was indispensable to extrapolate data prior to 1990, in order to ensure a single 
and uniform sequence of information. 
 
3.2.2. Estimation results 
  
Table 8 presents the values obtained from the estimation of the model through 
the method of ordinary least squares (OLS). When no lags are considered, 
column (i) shows us that the elasticity of the PMI’s labour productivity (Y) 
relative to variables X1, X2 and X3 is 1.0284, 0.7047 and -0.7852 respectively. 
These results confirm Hypothesis 1, since Y presents a positive correlation with 
public R&D intensity by the Portuguese State (X1). Hypothesis 2 is equally 
confirmed because, as we can see in Table 8, when private intensity in R&D by 
ME, EOE and TE increases 1%, then Y will rise by 0.7047%. Hypothesis 3 on 
the other hand is not confirmed. The variable X3 related to the weight of the 
employment in medium and high-tech sectors appears negatively connected to 
productivity, but it is not statistically significant. 
The independent variables as a whole reflect a good explanatory capacity 
for the PMI’s labour productivity, once that FObserved is higher than FCritical at the 
5% significance level. The high R2 reflects a good adjustment of the model. In 
this particular case, 85.22 percent of the total variation in the PMI’s labour 
productivity is explained by the independent variables considered in the model. 
As for the possible presence of an autocorrelation of errors, we observed a 
positive autocorrelation18 (p > 0), once that Durbin-Watson’s value (d = 0.4728) 
falls in the interval ] 0; d L  [19. 
                                               
18
 In this situation, an increase in the labour productivity in the period t generates a positive 
impact on the residue of the following period (period t +1).  
19
 The value of dL with a 5% significance level is given by 1.101.  
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Table 8. Estimation results20 
 
Variable Parameter (i) (ii)1y lag (iii)2y lag (iv)3y lag (v)4y lag 
 
X0 
 
β0 4.1631** (2.8379) 
3.3048** 
(2.4053) 
2.9816** 
(2.4310) 
2.9294** 
(2.8095) 
2.9002* 
(3.0628) 
 
X1 
 
β1 1.0284 (1.5187) 
1.0856*** 
(1.7430) 
0.8581*** 
(1.8808) 
0.7017** 
(2.2216) 
0.6484** 
(2.4176) 
 
X2 
 
β2 0.7047** (2.3861) 
0.5939** 
(2.2660) 
0.6155* 
(3.1753) 
0.6347* 
(4.6363) 
0.5727* 
(4.9456) 
 
X3 
 
β3 -0.7852 (-0.5663) 
-1.1523 
(-0.8883) 
-0.8530 
(-0.8772) 
-0.5919 
(-0.8068) 
-0.3875 
(-0.5928) 
 
Observations 
 
 24 23 22 21 20 
 
R2  
 
 0.8522 0.8433 0.8463 0.8747 0.8938 
 
Durbin-Watson 
 
 0.4728 0.4720 0.3938 0.3986 0.5965 
 
FCritical** 
 
 3.10 3.13 3.16 3.20 3.24 
 
FObserved 
 
 38.4393 34.0836 33.0371 39.5581 44.8864 
Notes: Tvalues between brackets. In column (i) the model is estimated without any lag, in 
column (ii) with a 1-year lag for variables X1 and X2, in column (iii) with a 2-year lag, in 
column (iv) with a 3-year lag and in column (v) with a 4-year lag. 
* Significance at 1% ; ** Significance at 5% ; *** Significance at 10%  
 
Considering the model with lags for R&D related variables (X1 and X2), 
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 are once again confirmed. With regard to 
Hypothesis 1, the return from the public R&D activity reaches its peak one year 
after the investment has been made (an increase in X1 of 1 percent in period t 
leads to a rise of Y by about 1.086 percent in period t+1). From that point, an 
increase in the PMI’s labour productivity resultant from the public activity in 
R&D becomes increasingly smaller, because a significant part of the impact of 
this investment has already been amortized. As for Hypothesis 2, private 
intensity in R&D by ME, EOE and TE is still positively correlated with the 
PMI’s labour productivity, but the greatest contribution to productivity growth 
in given in the initial year. This situation can be justified by the fact that direct 
impact and the inherent spillovers from this investment occur in a relatively 
shorter period of time. 
                                               
20
 The estimation was carried out with the EViews software.  
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The econometric model still presents a good adjustment and the 
independent variables as a whole still reflect a good explanatory capacity 
towards the dependent variable (only X3 is not statistically significant). This 
model maintains a positive autocorrelation of the errors once that             
Durbin-Watson’s value (with a 5% significance level) in any temporal lag falls 
in the interval ] 0 ; dL [21.  
 
4.  Discussion and implications 
 
Our model makes many simplifying assumptions, but its main virtue is that it 
takes into consideration the indirect impact of public R&D as well as of medium 
and high-tech industries R&D in other sectors where the R&D effort is made. 
Our results confirm the importance of governement’s R&D and of business 
R&D in the medium to high-tech sectors, as they stimulate productivity growth. 
We further reveal that the return from the public R&D activity reaches its peak 
one year after the investment has been made, while for private intensity in R&D 
by ME, EOE and TE the greatest contribution to productivity growth is given in 
the initial year. Hence, the direct impact and the inherent spillovers from the 
private expenditure in R&D occur in a relatively shorter period of time than that 
of public investment. R&D is overwhelming important, but, R&D expenditures 
may be only one part of the story behind the Portuguese backlog. Factors such 
as absorptive capacity, interactions within the S&T system, regulation and 
stability may be just as important in achieving the TP ambition.  
Regarding the role of structural change, the results deserve an in-depth 
analysis and the conclusions are not straightforward.  
In the countries examined by Kaloudis and Smith (2005), there has been a 
clear tendency for the share of low-tech industries in manufacturing to decline 
during the period 1980-1999, while the share of high-tech industries has 
increased. This applies to both production and employment. However, they 
concluded that among the OECD countries studied, structural change within 
manufacturing is not the direct cause of the growth process in advanced OECD 
economies. In our case we did not identified a decline or (growth) in the weight 
                                               
21
 ii)   d  = 0.4720;     d L  = 1.078;     d U  = 1.660     = >     d < d L.  
   iii)  d  = 0.3938;     d L  = 1.053;     d U  = 1.664     = >     d < d L.  
   iv)  d  = 0.3986;     d L  = 1.026;     d U  = 1.669     = >     d < d L.  
   v)   d = 0.5965;     d L  = 0.998;     d U  = 1.676     = >     d < d L.    
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of technology intensive industries. Probably for that reason we could not 
confirm Hypothesis 3. Othewise, the fact that high-tech sectors are growing 
faster than medium or low-tech sectors in manufacturing output, does not 
necessarily mean that high-tech contributes more to overall manufacturing 
growth or productivity growth. High-tech sectors are small, so even high growth 
rates can have a relatively diminutive overall impact.  
 Based on our findings for Hipothese 3, we cannot hypothesize that 
productivity growth was primarily rooted on the creation of new sectors. 
Overwhelming important has been probably the internal transformation of 
sectors which already existed and/or are growing. Hence, one must avoid the 
views that emphasize excessively the role of high-tech sectors in economic 
growth, which often underestimate processes of change and needs in those 
sectors of the economy with low R&D investments. Finally, there has been 
structural change at the level of the economy as a whole, with a sustained risen 
in the share of services, and this rise does not support the high-tech argument, 
since sevices in general tend to be considered less R&D intensive than high-tech 
manufacturing. Moreover, a developed service sector may well contribute 
significantly to manufacturing productivity, and this fact was not taken into 
account in our analysis.  
But, as refered previously, even if an industry’s employment share 
remains constant over time, there may have been a lot of entry and exit of firms 
and innovation (products and processes) in that industry. We verified that the 
innovation developments in the industries under consideration had positive 
impact on the productivity evolution in the time period analysed. The 
dynamisation of business R&D in the Portuguese manufacturing relies 
substantially on the dynamics of medium to high-tech industries, even if they do 
not gain considerable weight in the total employment or value-added.  
Finally, from the analysis it is possible to derive future research avenues. 
As demonstrated by several studies, there has been a clear tendency for the share 
of low-tech industries in manufacturing to decline, while the share of high-tech 
industries has increased. It is nevertheless important to confront the claims of 
high-tech approaches with the evidence. 
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Appendice 1 
 
 
High-tech classification of manufacturing industries 
Global 
Technological 
Intensity 
Economic Activity 
Avergae 
R&D 
Intensity 
High-technology  
• Aeronautics and aerospacial 
• Pharmaceutic products 
• Office equipment and computing 
• Radio, TV and communication equipment 
• Medical instruments and optical 
7,7% – 13,3% 
Medium-high  
technology  
• Machinery and electric equipment 
• Motorvehicles 
• Chemicals, except pharmaceutical industry 
• Rail and transport equipment n.e. 
• Other machinery and equipment 
2,1% – 3,9% 
Medium-low 
technology  
• Construction and naval repair 
• Coke, Petrol and nucler  
• Non-metallic mineral products  
• Basic metals and metallic products 
• Metallic products (except machinery and equipment) 
0,6% – 1% 
Low-technology 
• Recycling 
• Pulp, paper, paper products, publishing and printing  
• Food, beverages and tobacco 
• Textiles 
• Fur and leather 
• Wood and cork products 
0,3% – 0,5% 
Source: OECD based on NACE rev. 1.1. 
 
